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INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND
COMPARATIVE MENTAL DISABILITY LAW:
THE ROLE OF INSTITUTIONAL PSYCHIATRY IN THE
SUPPRESSION OF POLITICAL DISSENT
Michael L. Perlin*
For many years, institutional psychiatry was a major tool in the suppression of political
dissent. Moreover it appears painfully clear that, while the worst excesses of the past have
mostly disappeared, the problem is not limited to the pages of history. What is more, the
revelations of the worst of these abuses (and the concomitant rectification of many of them)
may, paradoxically, have created the false illusion that all the major problems attendant to
questions of institutional treatment and conditions in these nations have been solved. This
is decidedlv not so.
Remarkably, the issue of the human rights of persons with mental disabilities had been
ignored for decades by the international agencies vested with the protection of human rights
on a global scale. Within the legal literature, it appears that the first time disability rights were
conceptualized as a human rights issue was as recently as 1993 when, in a groundbreaking
article, Eric Rosenthal and Leonard Rubenstein first applied international human rights
principles to the institutionalization of people with mental disabilities.
For people with mental disabilities, in particular the development of human rights
protections may be even more significant than for people with other disabilities. Like people
with other disabilities, people with mental disabilities face degradation, stigmatization, and
discrimination throughout the world today. But unlike people with other disabilities, many
people with mental disabilities are routinely confined, against their will, in institutions, and
deprived of their freedom, dignity, and basic human rights. People with mental disabilities
who are fortunate enough to live outside of institutions often remain imprisoned by the social
isolation they experience, often from their own families. They are not included in educational
programs, and they fice attitudinal barriers to employment because they have not received
the education and training needed to obtain employment or because of discrimination based
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The Author can be contacted at mperlin@nyls.edu. The Author wishes to thank Daniel Gershburg
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(December 2005), and at a lecture sponsored by the American Constitution Society, the Human
Rights Program, and the Institute for Law, Psychiatry, and Public Policy at the University of
Virginia Law School (February 2006).
COMPARATIVE MENTAL DISABILITY LAW
on unsubstantiated fears and prejudice. Only recently have disability discrimination laws
and policies in the United States and elsewhere focused on changing such attitudes and
promoting the integration of people with disabilities into our schools, neighborhoods, and
workplaces.
The question remains, however: to what extent has institutional, state-sponsored
psychiatry been used as a tool of political suppression, and what are the implications of this
pattern and practice? After an Introductory section (Part I), I discuss, in Part II, the first
revelations of the dehumanization inflicted on persons with mental disabilities, primarily
(but not exclusively) in Soviet Bloc nations. In Part III, I discuss developments after these
revelations were publicized. In Part IV I weigh the extent to which the post-revelation
reforms have been effective and meaningful. In Part , I explain the meanings of sanism
and pretextualip, and discuss how they relate to the topic at hand. Then, in Part VI, I raise
questions that have not yet been answered, and that, I believe, should help set the research
agendas of those thinking about these important issues.
I. Introduction
Writing several years ago about the need for enforcement of international human
rights protections against political abuse, Professor George Alexander concluded
that "psychiatric incarceration may occasion a greater intrusion of the rights of the
politically unpopular than mere jailing."' He came to this finding by way of his
consideration of the "unique role" of state psychiatry "in discrediting opinion and
dehumanizing those with whom one disagrees.11
2
This is a powerful charge and is one that might appear puzzling to many readers.
Because psychiatric intervention is medical treatment, we assume that it has been
undertaken for benevolent purposes. Indeed, in rejecting the appellant's argument
that the burden-of-proof in involuntary civil commitment cases should be "beyond
a reasonable doubt" (the same standard used in criminal cases in the US), the US
Supreme Court made it clear that it saw a significant difference between the loss of
liberty in a criminal case, and the loss of liberty in a civil commitment case:
Even though an erroneous confinement should be avoided in the first
instance, the layers of professional review and observation of the
George Alexander, International Human Rights Protection Against Political Abuses, 37 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 387, 392 (1997).
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patient's condition, and the concern of family and friends generally
will provide continuous opportunities for an erroneous commitment
to be corrected. It is not true that the release of a genuinely mentally
ill person is no worse for the individual than the failure to convict
the guilty. One who is suffering from a debilitating mental illness
and in need of treatment is neither wholly at liberty nor free of
stigma. It cannot be said, therefore, that it is much better for a
mentally ill person to "go free" than for a mentally normal person
to be committed.'
Yet, if we are to consider the well-documented history of the use of state psychiatry
in the Soviet bloc and in China, we are forced to confront the reality that, for many
years, procedural safeguards such as these were totally absent, and institutional
psychiatry was a major tool in the suppression of political dissent.4 Moreover, it
appears painfully clear that, while the worst excesses of the past have mostly
disappeared,5 the problem is not limited to the pages of history. What is more, the
revelations of the worst of these abuses (and the concomitant rectification of many of
them) may, paradoxically, have created the false illusion that all the major problems
attendant to questions of institutional treatment and conditions in these nations have
been solved. This is decidedly not so.'
Remarkably, the issue of the human rights of persons with mental disabilities had
been ignored for decades by the international agencies vested with the protection of
Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418. 429-430 (1979); see generally I MICHAEL L. PERLIN: MENTAL
DISABILITY LAW: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL § 2C-5.1a, at 395-400 (2nd ed. 1998). 1 critique what I
characterize as the "pretextual assumptions" of Addington in MICHAEL L. PERLIN, THE HIDDEN
PREJUDICE: MENTAL DISABILITY ON TRIAL 95-96 (2000) [hereinafter PERLIN, THP]. On the meaning
of"pretextuality" in this context, see infra Part V.
4 As Richard Bonnie explains:
Psychiatric incarceration of mentally healthy people is uniformly understood to be a
particularly pernicious, form of repression, because it uses the powerful modalities of
medicine as tools of punishment, and it compounds a deep affront to human rights with
deception and fraud. Doctors who allow themselves to be used in this way (certainly as
collaborators, but even as victims of intimidation) betray the trust of society and breach
their most basic ethical obligations as professionals.
Richard Bonnie, Political Abuse of Psychiatry in the Soviet Union and in China: Complexities and
Controversies, 30 J. AMER. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 136, 136 (2002).
But not entirely. See infra text accompanying notes 84-90.
Michael Perlin, International Human Rights and Comparative Mental Disability Law: the Universal
Factors, SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COMMERCE (in press 2007).
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human rights on a global scale.7  Dr. Theresa Degener, a noted disability scholar
and activist, thus observed that "drafters of the International Bill of Human Rights
[IHBR] did not include disabled persons as a distinct group vulnerable to human rights
violations," and that "none of the equality clauses of any of the three instruments of
[the IHBR] mention disability as a protected category."'
Degener's writings reflect the change that has taken place in disability rights
jurisprudence. In 2000, she stated further that "disability has been reclassified as a
human rights issue," and that "law reforms in this area are intended to provide equal
opportunities for disabled people and to combat their segregation, institutionalization
and exclusion as typical forms of disability-based discrimination.' 9
To some extent, this new interest in human rights protections for people with
disabilities tracks a larger international movement to protect human rights, 9 and
appears to more precisely track C. Raj Kumar's observation that "the judicial
protection of human rights and constitutionalization of human rights may be two
important objectives by which the rule of law can be preserved and which may govern
future human rights work."'I
Within the legal literature, it appears that the first time disability rights
was conceptualized as a human ights issue was as recently as 1993 when, in
a groundbreaking article, Eric Rosenthal and Leonard Rubenstein first applied
international human rights principles to the institutionalization of people with mental
disabilities. 12 This article was relied on almost immediately by scholars and activists
Text infra accompanying notes 8-20 is mostly adapted from MICHAEL L, PERLIN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS AND COMPARATIVE MENTAL DISABILITY LAw: CASES AND MATERIALS ch. 1 (2006).
Theresia Degener, International Disability Law-A New Legal Subject on the Rise: The Interregional
Experts'Meeting in Hong Kong, December 13-17, 1999, 18 BERKELEY J. INTL. L. 180, 187
(2000). The three instruments are the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) (UDHR),
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) (ICCPR), and the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966) (ICESCR).
Degener, supra note 8, at 18 1.
'o See B.G. Ramacharan, Strategies for the International Protection of Human Rights in the 1990s,
13 Hum. RTS. Q. 155 (1991). Ramacharan is former deputy UN high commissioner for human
rights.
C. Raj Kumar, Moving Beyond Constitutionalization and Judicial Protection of Human Rights
Building on the Hong Kong Experience of Civil Society Empowerment, 26 Loy. L.A. INT'L &
COMp. L. REV. 281, 281-282 (2003).
1 Eric Rosenthal & Leonard S. Rubenstein, International Human Rights Advocacy under the
Principles for the Protection of Persons with Mental Illness, 16 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 257
(1993).
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studying the human rights implications of mental disability laws in Japan 13 and in
Uruguay.
14
For people with mental disabilities, in particular, the development of human rights
protections may be even more significant than for people with other disabilities.
Like people with other disabilities, people with mental disabilities face degradation,
stigmatization, and discrimination throughout the world today. 5 But unlike people
with other disabilities, many people with mental disabilities are routinely confined,
against their will, in institutions, and deprived of their freedom, dignity, and basic
human rights. People with mental disabilities who are fortunate enough to live outside
of institutions often remain imprisoned by the social isolation they experience, often
from their own families. They are not included in educational programs, and they
face attitudinal barriers to employment because they have not received the education
and training needed to obtain employment or because of discrimination based on
unsubstantiated fears and prejudice. Only recently have disability discrimination laws
and policies in the United States and elsewhere focused on changing such attitudes and
promoting the integration of people with disabilities into our schools, neighborhoods,
and workplaces. 6
I believe that the omnipresent deprivations of freedom, dignity, and human rights
are the product of what I refer to as sanism and what I refer to aspretextualio. I define
'3 See Pamela Schwartz Cohen, Psychiatric Commitment in Japan: International Concern and
Domestic Reform, 14 UCLA PAC. BASIN L. J. 28, 35 n.48 (1995).
See Angelika C. Moncada, Involuntary Commitment and the Use of Seclusion and Restraint in
Uruguay: a Comparison with the United Nations Principles for the Protection of Persons with
Mental Illness, 25 U. MIAsN INTER-AM. L. REv. 589, 591 n.6 (1994).
'5 See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 573 U.S. 432,462 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting
in part), arguing that "The mentally retarded have been subject to a 'lengthy and tragic history'
of segregation and discrimination that can only be called grotesque," and describing a regime of
state-mandated segregation and degradation... that in its virulence and bigotry rivaled, and indeed
paralleled, the worst excesses of Jim Crow.
6 See e.g., Michael L. Perlin, "W7mat ' Good Is Bad, What's Bad Is Good You'll Find out When
You Reach the Top, You're on the Bottom:" Are the Americans with Disabilities Act (and
Olmstead v. L.C.) Anything More than "Idiot Wind, "? 35 U. MICH. J. L. REF. 235 (2001-2002);
Michael L. Perlin, "I Ain 't Gonna Work on Maggie 's Farm No More:" Institutional Segregation,
Community Treatment, the ADA, and the Promise of Olmstead v. L.C., 17 T.M. COOLEY L. Rv.
53 (2000); Michael L. Perlin, "For the Misdemeanor Outlaw" The Impact of the ADA on the
Institutionalization of Criminal Defendants with Mental Disabilities, 52 ALABAALA L. REV. 193
(2000); Michael L. Perlin, "Their Promises of Paradise:" Will Olmstead v L. C. Resuscitate The
Constitutional Least Restrictive Alternative Principle in lental Disability Law?, HousToN L. REv.
999 (2000) [hereinafter Perlin, Paradise], all discussing the Americans with Disabilities Act, see
42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq.
Michael L. Perlin
COMPARATIVE MENTAL DISABILITY LAW
sanism as an irrational prejudice of the same quality and character of other irrational
prejudices that cause (and are reflected in) prevailing social attitudes of racism, sexism,
homophobia, and ethnic bigotry, that infects jurisprudence and lawyering practices,
that is largely invisible and largely socially acceptable, that is based predominantly
upon stereotype, myth, superstition, and deindividualization, and is sustained and
perpetuated by our use of a false "ordinary common sense" and heuristic reasoning
in an unconscious response to events both in everyday life and in the legal process.17
And I define pretextuality as the ways in which courts accept-either implicitly or
explicitly-testimonial dishonesty and engage similarly in dishonest and frequently
meretricious decision-making, specifically where witnesses, especially expert
witnesses, show a high propensity to purposely distort their testimony in order to
achieve desired ends.18 I do not believe we can make any sense of the phenomena that
are at the heart of this paper without seriously considering the pernicious impact of
sanism and pretextuality on all of mental disability law.19
It is clear that, within the past decade, there has been an explosion of interest in
the area of human rights and mental disability law2 -- by academics, practitioners,
advocates, and self-advocates. 21 And, importantly, organizations such as Amnesty
International and the Helsinki Committees have finally-if tardily- recognized that
violations of persons' mental health rights are violations of human rights .
22
PERLIN, THP, sapra note 3, at 21-58.
Id at 59-76.
'9 See, e.g., Michael L. Perlin, She Breaks Just like a Little Girl: Neonaticide, the Insanity Defense,
and the Irrelevance of "Ordinary Common Sense," 10 WM. & NIARY J. WOMEN & L. 1, 6 n.188
(2003); see generally infra Part V.
20 See, e.g., Michael L. Perlin, Things Have Changed: Looking at Non-institutional -Mental Disability
Law Through the Sanism Filter 46 N.YL. ScH. L. REV. 535, 539 (2002-2003) discussing the recent
"explosion of case law and commentary "in this area of the law; see also Arlene S. Kanter, The
Globalization oftDisability Rights Law, 30 SYR. J. INT'L L. & COMM. 241, 268 (2003) noting that
in recent years the situation has changed dramatically as "the principle of non-discrimination and
equality for people with disabilities has entered center stage in the international arena."
21 See generally, 1-5 PERLIN, supra note 3; PERLIN, THP, supra note 3; MICHAEL L. PERLIN, MENTAL
DISABILITY LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS (2nd ed. 2005).
22 Symposium Transcript, The Application of International Human Rights Law to Institutional
Mental Disability Law 21, N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMp. L. 387, 391 (2002) (Comments of Eric
Rosenthal):
I began my research... by examining the human ights studies of non-governmental
organizations such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International. I also looked at the
U.S. Department of State's Country Reports on Human Rights Practices. What I found is
shocking: those human rights organizations andhuman rights reports criticized governments
when political dissidents were put in psychiatric facilities, but they did not speak out about
the abuses against other people who may or may not have mental disabilities.
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The question remains, however: to what extent has institutional, state-sponsored
psychiatry been used as a tool of political suppression, and what are the implications
of this pattern and practice? Even though the worst excesses of Soviet-sanctioned
political suppression came to an end with the dissolution of the Soviet empire, the
problem remains a serious one in other nations (most importantly, China). Just as
important, the pervasive impact of sanism and pretextuality continue to, globally,
contaminate public psychiatric practice. This contamination is particularly corrosive
because the dramatic and well-publicized cessation of the Soviet bloc'spolitical abuses
have lulled us into a false consciousness through which we inaccurately believe that
the underlying problems have disappeared. They have not.
This Article will proceed in the following manner In Part II, I will discuss the
first revelations of the "dehumanization" referred to by Professor Alexander. In
Part III, I will discuss developments after these revelations were publicized. In Part
IV, I will weigh the extent to which the post-revelation reforms have been effective
and meaningful. In Part V, I will elaborate upon the meanings of "sanism "and
"pretextuality," and discuss how they relate to the topic at hand. Then, in Part VI, I
will raise questions that have not yet been answered, and that, I believe, should help
set the research agendas of those thinking about these important issues.
II. The First Revelations
The history of the use of institutional psychiatry as a political tool was documented
by Michel Foucault 40 years ago.23 Foucault examined the expanded use of the public
hospital in France in the 17' century, and concluded that "confinement [was an] answer
to an economic crisis...reduction of wages, unemployment, scarcity of coin." 24 By the
181, century, the psychiatric hospital-a place of "doomed and despised idleness
25
satisfied "the indissociably economic and moral demand for confinement.
26
See also, Krasimir Kanev, State, Human Rights, and Mental Health in Bulgaria, 21 N.Y.L. SCH.
J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 435, 435 (2002). Amnesty International first involved itself in this issue in
Bulgaria in 2001.
21 MICHEL FOUCAULT, MADNESS AND CIVILIZATION: A HISTORY OF INSANITY IN THE ACE OF REASON 46-57
(Richard Howard trans. 1965).
24 Id. at 47.
21 Id. at 55.
26 Id.
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The first important modem revelations appear in Sidney Bloch and Peter
Reddaway's shattering 1985 study, Psychiatric Terror: How Soviet Psychiatry is Used
to Suppress Dissent.27 Bloch and Reddaway documented the cases of nearly 500
political dissenters forcibly hospitalized from 1950-1970.2 This was accomplished,
in large part, by the Soviet approach to diagnosis (and its uniquely broad formulation
of "schizophrenia," "a critical factor in labeling dissent as 'mental illness.' 29 Bloch
and Reddaway revealed that Soviet forensic psychiatrists diagnosed dissenters
as expressing "paranoid reformist delusional ideas" in case reports;3" the patient's
conviction that "the state ... must be changed" was seen as an indicia of mental illness."
This tactic served three interrelated ends: It allowed the government to avoid the sorts
of procedural safeguards that are normally associated with criminal prosecution.
2
Second, the stigma of a "mentally ill" label effectively discredits the politics of the
person being so labeled.33 Finally, because there were, at that time, no maximum
terms to civil commitments,3 4 confinement to psychiatric hospitals was indefinite.1
5
Studies such as the one done by Bloch and Reddaway awakened the West to the
realities of the ways that psychiatry was being misused in the service of totalitarian
political regimes, a misuse that continued until the 1990s. Of course, as Bonnie has
noted,"The risks of mistake and abuse are further magnified, of course, in totalitarian
societies, where the state has the power and inclination to bend all institutions to
its will and, where the counterforces may be weak or nonexistent, depending on the
country's pretotalitarian history."36 Not coincidentally, reports such as this provided
activists with the first important evidence that international human rights law was
27 SIDNEY BLOCH & PETER REDDAWAY, PSYCHIATRIC TERROR: How SOVIET PSYCHIATRY IS USED TO SUPPRESS
DISSENT 280-330 (1977).
28 SIDNEY BLOCH & PETER REDDAWAY, SOVIET PSYCHIATRIC ABUSE: THE SHADOW OVER WORLD PSYCHIATRY
(1984).
29 Sidney Bloch & Peter Reddaway, Psychiatrists and Dissenters in the Soviet Union, in THE BREAKING
OF BODIES AND MINDS: TORTURE, PSYCHIATRIC ABUSE, AND THE HEALTH PROFESSIONS 132, 147-158
(Eric Stover & Elena 0. Nightingale eds., 1985).
30 Id.
31 Id.
32 Compare Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
" On how it is socially acceptable to use pejorative labels to describe and single out persons with
mental illness, see Michael L. Perlin, "Where the Winds Hit Heavy on the Borderline: " Mental
Disability Law, Theory and Practice, Us and Them, 31 LOYOLA L.A. L. REV. 775, 786 (1998).
31 Compare State v. Fields, 390 A. 2d 574 (N.J. 1978) (establishing ight to periodic review of
commitments at which state bears burden of proof); see generally 1 PERLIN, supra note 3, § 2C-
6.5c, at 456-62.
31 See Alexander, supra note 1, at 391.
36 Bonnie, supra note 4, at 140.
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potentially an important tool for countries "without democratic and constitutional
systems because it may provide the only genuine safeguard against the abuse of
persons with mental disabilities-abuse that may be based on political, social, or
cultural grounds ."
37
By 1989, changes in the political climate in the Soviet Union led the Soviet
government-over the objection of the psychiatric leadership 38-to allow a
delegation of psychiatrists and academics from the United States, representing the
U.S. Government, to conduct extensive interviews of suspected victims of abuse and
to make unrestricted site visits to hospitals selected by the delegation 9 Reporting on
this issue in 1999, Professors Richard Bonnie (one of the members of the delegation)
and Svetlana Polubinskaya explained:
The investigation by the U.S. delegation provided unequivocal proof
that the tools of coercive psychiatry had been used, even in the late
1980s, to hospitalize persons who were not mentally ill and whose
only transgression had been the expression of political or religious
dissent. Most of the patients interviewed by the delegation had
been charged with political crimes such as anti-Soviet agitation and
propaganda or defaming the Soviet state. Their offenses involved
behavior such as writing and distributing anti-Soviet literature,
political organizing, defending the rights of disabled groups and
furthering religious ideas.
Lawrence 0. Gostin & Lance Gable, The Human Rights of Persons With Mental Disabilities: A
Global Perspective on the Application of Human Rights Principles to Mental Health, 63 MD. L.
REV. 20, 21 (2004). See also Bonnie, supra note 4, at 140. "The Soviet experience was significant
because it provided a vivid illustration of the risks associated with unchecked psychiatric power, and
the importance of erecting institutional safeguards to minimize these risks in the context of involuntary
hospitalization and neatment."
3 Bloch and Reddaway explain that Soviet psychiatrists who rendered such diagnoses (referred to as
"core psychiatrists") received many contingent benefits for cooperating with the authorities:
The rewards of the good life include access to a variety of privileges and benefits not
available to ordinary Soviet citizens. The core psychiatrist is likely to travel abroad, as a
tourist or as an attendant at a conference, to have access to stores selling luxury goods at
moderate prices, to have a country cottage, and to take vacations at special sanatoria. Their
salaries are about three times higher in real terms than those of ordinary psychiatrists.
BLOCH & REDDAWAY, supra note 27, at 322.
3 Richard J. Bonnie & Svetlana V Polubinskaya, Unraveling Soviet Psychiatry, 10 J. CONTEMP. LEG.
Iss. 279, 279 (1999). See also Richard Bonnie, Soviet Psychiatry and Human Rights: Reflections
in the Report of the U.S. Delegation, 18 LAW, MED. & HEALTH CARE 123 (1990).
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Under applicable laws of Russia and the other former Soviet
Republics, a person charged with crime could be subjected to
custodial measures of a medical nature if the criminal act was
proven and the person was found non-imputable due to mental
illness. 40  Non-imputable offenders could be placed in maximum
security hospitals (the notorious special hospitals) or in ordinary
hospitals depending on their social dangerousness.
4'
The delegation found that no clinical basis existed for the
judicial finding of non-imputability in seventeen of these cases.
In fact, the delegation found no evidence of mental disorder of
any kind in fourteen cases. In all likelihood, these individuals are
representative of many hundreds of others who were found non-
imputable for crimes of political or religious dissent in the U.S.S.R.,
mainly between 1970 and 1990.42
Glumly, Bonnie and Polubinskaya concluded that this repressive use of psychiatry
in Russia was made "inevitable 43 by the "communist regime's intolerance for dissent,
including any form of political or religious deviance, and by the corrosive effects of
corruption and intimidation in all spheres of social life. '44 On this point, they indicted
"a subset of Soviet psychiatrists4 [who] knowingly collaborated with the KGB to
subject mentally healthy dissidents to psychiatric punishment, in blatant violation
of professional ethics and human rights. '46 In this respect, they concluded, "abuse
of psychiatry in the Soviet Union had less to do with psychiatry per se than with
the repressiveness of the political regime of which the psychiatrists were a part.1
4 7
41 See generally, Jerry D. Baker, Nonimputability in Soviet CriminalLaw: The Soviet Approach to the
Insanity Plea, 11 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 55 (1987).
41 RSFSR arts. 58-61 (Criminal Code) (1962) reprinted in THE SOVIET CODES OF LAW 88-89 (Harold
J. Berman & James W. Spindler trans., William B. Simons ed., 1980) SOVIET CODES; RSFSR arts.
410-413 (Code of Criminal Procedure 1962) reprinted in SOVIET CODES OF LAW, id. at 315-316.
42 Bonnie & Polubinskaya, supra note 39, at 280-282.
43 Id. at 283-284.
44 Id.
4' These were ones who were associated primarily with Moscow's Serbskii Institute for General and
Forensic Psychiatry. Id.
46 Id.
41 Id. at 283-84 (most footnotes omitted). See id. at 284-285:
The roots of the problem lie much deeper in the attitudes and training of Soviet psychiatrists,
and in the role of psychiatry in Soviet society. Repression of political and religious dissidents
was only the most overt symptom of an authoritarian system of psychiatric care in which an
expansive and elastic view of mental disorder encompassed all forms of unorthodox thinking,
and in which psychiatric diagnosis was essentially an exercise of social power.
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Indeed, "psychiatry was a state institution," and "the social prestige of psychiatrists
lay almost entirely in their role as agents of social control, and psychiatrists were more
closely aligned with the police than with other specialties in medicine.1
48
More recent studies of other Soviet bloc nations revealed similar patterns of
behavior. Krassimir Kanev, Bulgaria's leading human rights activist, has noted,
"Observations show that in the absence of an accurate definition of 'danger,'4 9
Bulgarian psychiatry, as well as the Bulgarian judiciary, combine clinical criteria
with the values of society in an astonishing way."5 A review of civil commitment in
Romania reveals a practice that can only be characterized as macabre:
During the Ceaucescu regime, Article 114 was used in conjunction
with Decree Law 12, On the Medical Treatment of Dangerously
Mentally Ill Persons, to systematically confine dissidents, on the
recommendation of the State Prosecutor or health authorities,
as mentally ill persons. Dissent, often expressed through the
propagation of anti-state propaganda or illegal departure from the
country,51 was itself viewed as a symptom of severe mental illness.
41 Id. at 287-288.
41 On the multiple textures of the word "danger" in this context, see 1 PERLIN, supra note 3, § 2A-4.1,
at 92-101. To be subject to involuntary civil commitment, one must be seriously mentally ill, and,
as a result of that mental illness, a likely danger to self or others. See id. § 2A-4.2, at 101-04.
On the relationship between involuntary civil commitment and the United Nations' Principles
for the Protection of Persons with Mental Illness and the Improvement of Mental Health Care
(MI Principles), see Bruce Winick, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Treatment of People with
Mental Illness in Eastern Europe: Construing International Human Rights Law, 21 N.YL. ScH.
J. INV'L & COMP. L. 537, 556-559 (2002); Eric Rosenthal & Clarence J. Sundram, International
Human Rights in Mental Health Legislation, 21 N.Y.L. ScH. J. INT'L & CoMp. L. 469, 527-531
(2002).
50 Kanev, supra note 22, at 439.
Romania Decree Law 12. See generally INTERNATIONAL AssoCIATION ON THE POLITICAL USE OF
PSYCHIATRY, INFORMATON BULLETIN No. 6 (Mar. 1983). Article 166 stated:
Propaganda of a Fascist nature and propaganda against the socialist state, committed by
any means in public, is punished by a sentence of imprisonment from 5 to 15 years and
the forfeiture of certain rights. Propaganda or the undertaking of any action with the aim
of changing the Socialist system or activities which could result in a threat to the security
of the state will be punished by a sentence of imprisonment from 5 to 15 years and the
forfeiture of certain rights.
Article 245 provided:
Entering or leaving the country through illegal crossing of the frontier will be punished
by a sentence of imprisonment from 6 months to 3 years. The acquisition of means or
Michael L. Perlin
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One psychiatrist in Romania, interviewed for this article, explained
why, in his opinion, this had to be true:
Under Ceaucescu, political opponents could not exist.... In
Ceaucescu's time, there was a man who said in the street with a
banner, "Down with Ceaucescu." Strictly professionally speaking,
it was difficult to believe that this was a real political opinion
because it was so obvious that no one would allow him to express
himself, so he had to be delusional and couldn't adjust. Real political
opposition [sic] were subversive.2
Romania's characterization of individuals attempting to flee as mentally ill
criminals reflected the former Soviet view that crossing the border is a sign of mental
illness, as is distributing religious leaflets." Reliance on such behaviors as the basis
for a diagnosis of mental illness is problematic for both the patient and the psychiatrist.
As Ochberg and Gunn have explained:
The psychiatrist has a dilemma. If he accepts society's definition
of madness without using his own separate criteria, he becomes a
depository for all sorts ofproblems unrelated to medicine and he risks
becoming an agent of society for the enforcement of contemporary
mores. On the other hand, if he takes the opposite view to extremes,
he ends up by refusing to treat any patient whose only symptoms
are behavioral and who does not show organic changes. 4
This state of affairs is not and was not limited to Russia and the Soviet Bloc.
Robin Munro's monumental study of state psychiatry in China paints an equally
bleak picture. Munro charged that Chinese state psychiatry engaged in what he
characterized as hyper-diagnosis, or "the excessively broad clinical determination of
instruments of the undertaking of measures from which it unequivocally follows that the
offender intends to cross the frontier illegally will also be regarded as an attempt.
Sana Loue, The Involuntaiy Civil Commitment of Mentally Ill Persons in the United States and
Romania: A Comparative Analysis, 23 J. LEGAL MED. 65 (1996).
52 Id.
51 Id., quoting THERSA C. SMITH & THOMAS A. OUSZREUK. No ASYLUM: STATE PSYCHIATRIC REPRESSION
IN THE FORMER USSR 65 (1996).
5' Frank M. Ochberg & John Gunn, The Psychiatrist and the Policeman, 10 PSYCH. ANNALS. 35
(1980).
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mental illness,"55 as reflected in:
a tendency on the part of forensic psychiatrists to diagnose as
severely mentally ill, and therefore legally non-imputable for
their alleged offenses, certain types of dissident or nonconformist
detainees who were perceived by the police as displaying a puzzling
'absence of instinct for self-preservation 'when staging peaceful
political protests, expressing officially banned views, pursuing legal
complaints against corrupt or repressive officialdom, etc.
5 6
Munro characterized another category of politically motivated ethical abuse that
found in China as "severe medical neglect," resulting in "numerous mentally ill
individuals being sent to prison as political 'counter-revolutionaries' and then denied
all medical or psychiatric care for many years in an environment bound only to worsen
their mental condition. '5 7 Here, he charged that China engaged in "the deliberate
withholding of such care from political offenders whom the authorities had already
clearly diagnosed as being mentally ill.""
Munro drew on empirical studies showing that of 222 cases examined in which
diagnoses of schizophrenia were made, there were fifty-five cases of a political nature,
and forty-eight cases involving "disturbances of social order."59 From these statistics
(comparing them to the cohort of those diagnosed with serious mental illness who had
been charged with violent felonies), Munro concluded that "so-called political cases
and also those involving disturbance of public order are evidently seen by China's
legal-medical authorities as representing no less serious and dangerous a threat to
society than cases of murder and injury committed by genuinely psychotic criminal
offenders."6
5' Robin Munro, Judicial Psychiatrv in China andIts PoliticalAbuse, 14 COLUM. J. AsiANs L. 1, 26-27
(2000). As of the time of the writing of this Article, Munro was director of the Hong Kong office
of Human Rights Watch; he subsequently was appointed to be senior research fellow at the Centre
of Chinese Studies of the University of London.
56 Id at 26.
7 d. at 26-27.
58 Id
51 Id. at 84.
61 Id. at 84-85.
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III. Following the Revelations
As indicated above, the publicity that accompanied the exposes of conditions in
Russian psychiatric hospitals led to teams of investigators visiting Russia to confirm
the initial evidence.61 A 1989 U.S. delegation was followed by review team sent by the
World Psychiatric Association in 1991 6 At the same time, American representatives
met with Soviet mental health professionals in the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs
in an effort to seek cooperative solutions to the underlying problems.
63
Soon thereafter, Russia adopted a new mental health law, 64 and in the subsequent
two years, ten other former-Soviet bloc nations did the same.65 At the same time,
responding to growing concerns of the United Nations Human Rights Commission
on the question of the protection of those detained on the grounds of mental illness
(concerns spurred in large part by the revelations discussed in this Article),66 the United
61 See Bonnie, supra note 4, at 138: "One of the important purposes of mental health law reform in
the 1960s and 1970s was to bring coercive psychiatry within reach of the rule of law."
62 Bonnie & Polubinskaya, supra note 39, at 280.
63 Id
64 Id. at 292; see Richard J. Bonnie, Law of the Russian Federation on Psychiatric Care and
Guarantees of Citizens 'Rights in its Provision, 27 J. RUSSIAN & E. EUROPEAN PSYCHIATRY 69 (1994)
(reprinting text of law).
61 Bonnie & Polubinskaya, supra note 39, at 292-93.
66 Moncada, supra note 14, at 591 n.5 (1994):
The U.N. General Assembly acknowledged Human Rights Commission Resolution
10 A XXXIII (of March 11, 1977), requesting the Subcommission on Prevention of
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities [hereinafter the Subcommission] study the
problem of those detained on the grounds of mental illness with a view towards creating
some guidelines for their protection. G.A. Res. 33/53, U.N. GAOR, 33d Sess., U.N. Doc.
A/33/475, Dec. 14, 1978. The study by the Subcommission's Special Rapporteur, Erica-
Irene A. Daes, revealed that:
(a) Psychiatry in some States of the international community is often used
to subvert the political and legal guarantees of the freedom of the individual
and to violate seriously his human and legal rights; (b) In some States,
psychiatric hospitalization and treatment is forced on the individual who
does not support the existing political r6gime of the State in which he lives;
(c) In other States persons are detained involuntarily and are used as guinea
pigs for new scientific experiments; and (d) Many patients in a great number
of countries who should be in the proper care of a mental institution because
they are a danger to themselves, to others, or to the public, are living freely
and without any supervision.
Principles, Guidelines and Guarantees for the Protection of Persons Detained
on Grounds of Mental Ill-Health or Suffering from Mental Disorder,
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Nations adopted the Principles for the Protection of Persons with Mental Illness and
for the Improvement of Mental Health Care in 199167 (the MI Principles).
6
1
These Principles, establishing minimum human rights standards of practice in the
mental health field, have been recognized as "the most complete standards for the
protection of the rights of persons with mental disability at the international level,"6 9
and they have been used by international oversight and enforcement bodies as an
authoritative interpretation of the requirements of the ICESCR and the American
Convention on Human Rights.
70
The MI Principles establish standards for treatment and living conditions within
psychiatric institutions, and create protections against arbitrary detention in such
facilities. The MI Principles recognize that "[e]very person with a mental illness shall
have the right to live and work, to the extent possible in the community." They have
major implications for the structure of mental health systems since they recognize that
"[e]very patient shall have the right to be treated and cared for, as far as possible, in
the community in which he or she lives."
71
U.N. ESCOR, Comm'n on Hum. Rts., Sub-Comm'n on Prevention of
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, Report prepared by Erica-
Irene A. Daes at 28, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/17'Rev. 1 (1983) [hereinafter
Daes Report].
The Daes Report incorporates replies submitted by various governments
and non-governmental organizations.... In this vein, the reply by Amnesty
International underlined the abuse of psychiatry for political purposes and
present[ed] concrete complaints concerning the treatment of prisoners of
conscience and other persons inside psychiatric hospitals in the Soviet
Union.
Daes Report, id. at 16.
67 Principles for the Protection of Persons with Mental Illness and for the Improvement of Mental
Health Care, G.A. Res. 119, U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., Supp. No. 49, Annex, at 188-92, U.N. Doc.
A/46/49 (1991).
On the significance of soft law in the development of international human rights, see Christian
Courtis, Disability Rights in Latin America and International Cooperation, 9 Sw. J.L. & TRADE
Am. 109 (2002-2003). Soft law may guide the interpretation, elaboration, or application of hard
law; constitute norms that aspire to harden; serve as evidence of hard law; exist in parallel with
hard law obligations and act as a fall-back; or serve as a source of relatively hard obligations
through acquiescence or estoppel. See Jose Alvarez, The New Dispute Settlers: (Half Truths and
Consequences, 38 TEX. INT'L L.J. 405, 421 (2003).
9 Victor Rosario Congo v. Ecuador, Case 11.427, Inter-Am. C.H.R., OEA/Ser.L/V/11.95 Doc.7 rev.
at 475, para. 111 (1998).
7' Rosenthal & Sundram, supra note 49, at 488.
71 Id. at 489, citing MI Principles 3, 7(1)9 8(2), 15,15,18, & 24.
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The MI Principles also protect a broad array of rights within institutions, including
protections against harm, "including unjustified medication, abuse by other patients,
staff, or others...," and require the establishment of monitoring and inspection of
facilities to ensure compliance with the Principles. They require treatment "based
on an individually prescribed plan," and they require that "[t]he treatment of every
patient shall be directed towards preserving and enhancing personal autonomy." The
MI Principles establish substantive standards and procedural protections against
arbitrary detention in a psychiatric facility.72
Although the MI Principles do not speak specifically to the issue of psychiatry-
as-a-tool of state oppression, the European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR)71 has been interpreted in that specific
context. 7 Article 5(1) of the ECHR lists the circumstances in which governments
may justifiably deprive persons of their liberty and includes a provision referring to
"persons of unsound mind,"7 requiring such a finding so as to justify confinement in a
12 Id citing MI Principles 9(2), 9(4), & 22.
71 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, as amended by
Protocol No. 11. Nov. 1, 1998, available at http:/,,www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/D5CC24A7-
DC 13-4318-B457-5C9014916D7A/0/EnglishAnglais.pdf (last visited September 25, 2006).
71 On the relationship between the MI Principles and the ECHR, see Rosenthal & Sundram, supra
note 49, at 530:
Jurisprudence from the European Court of Human Rights demonstrates how similar many
of the provisions of the MI Principles are to the requirements of convention-based law.
In some cases, convention-based rights under the.. .ICCPR or the European Convention
on Human Rights (ECHR) may provide greater protections than do the MI Principles ....
The line of cases established under article 5 of the ECHR helps clarify many points not
specifically mentioned in the MI Principles.
Article 5- Right to Liberty and Security:
Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his
liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law:
a. the lawful detention of a person after conviction by a competent court;
b. the lawful arrest or detention of a person for non- compliance with the lawful
order of a court or in order to secure the fulfilment (sic) of any obligation
prescribed by law;
c. the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing
him before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having
committed an offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to
prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after having done so;
d. the detention of a minor by lawful order for the purpose of educational
supervision or his lawful detention for the purpose of bringing him before
the competent legal authority;
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mental hospital, but leaving the term undefined.7 6 In one of the leading European civil
commitment cases, however, the European Court of Human rights has said specifically
this Article would not permit the detention of a person simply because "his views or
behaviour deviate from the norms prevailing in a particular society.""
In short, the promulgation of the MI principles has the potential to be an important
bulwark against the sort of governmental misconduct that is exemplified by the Soviet
experience. This does not answer the question, however, of whether that potential has
been fulfilled.
IV. Law-in-Action vs. Law-on-the-Books: Have the Revelations Led to Meaningful
Change?
The dichotomy between "law on the books" and "law in action," is a gap that has
plagued American mental disability law since it began. Cases are decided on the
Supreme Court level, yet are not implemented in the states. The United States
Supreme Court has articulated sophisticated doctrine, for example, by mandating
dangerousness as a prerequisite for an involuntary civil commitment finding, yet trial
courts ignore that doctrine. The Supreme Court has issued elaborate guidelines to be
used in cases of criminal defendants who will likely never regain their competence
e. the lawful detention of persons for the prevention of the spreading of
infectious diseases, of persons of unsound mind, alcoholics or drug addicts
or vagrants;
f. the lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his effecting an
unauthorised entry into the country or of a person against whom action is
being taken with a view to deportation or extradition.
See European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, (ETS
No.5), 213 U.N.T.S 222, signed at Rome, Nov. 4,1950, entered into force Sept.3, 1953, as amended by
Protocol No. 11, entered into force Nov. 1, 1998. Reprinted in, MICHAEL L. PERLIN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIOHTS AND COMPARATIVE MENTAL DISABILITY LAW: DOCUMENTS SUPPLEMENT 161 (2006).
16 See generally Gostin & Gable, supra note 37, at 65-66.
17 Winterwerp v. The Netherlands, 33 Eur. Ct. H.R. Series A (1979) (Cf), at 16; O'Connor v.
Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 575 (1975):
May the State fence in the harmless mentally ill solely to save its citizens from exposure
to those whose ways are different? One might as well ask if the State, to avoid public
unease, could incarcerate all who are physically unattractive or socially eccentric. Mere
public intolerance or animosity cannot constitutionally justify the deprivation of a person's
physical liberty.
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to stand trial, yet, nearly thirty years later, half of the fifty states still ignore these
standards.
71
To what extent does this same gap continue in the nations that are the subject of
this paper? Regrettably, conditions in many Eastern European facilities are still so
substandard as to violate fundamental international human rights. Consider first
a report by Amnesty International condemning conditions in Romanian psychiatric
hospitals:
Many of the people placed in psychiatric wards and hospitals
throughout the country apparently do not suffer an acute mental
disorder and many do not require psychiatric treatment. Their
placement in psychiatric hospitals cannot be justified by the
provisions of the Law on Mental Health and they should also be
considered as people who have been arbitrarily deprived of their
liberty. They had been placed in the hospital on non-medical
grounds, apparently solely because they could not be provided
with appropriate support and services to assist them and/or their
families in the community. Often, because of their disability they
are more vulnerable to abuse, which apparently is not taken into
consideration by hospital staff as in most places such residents were
not segregated from people who have different needs for care."
Similarly, when Amnesty International investigated conditions in Bulgaria, it
documented cases of women locked in a cage outside one institution. The cage was
full of urine and feces and the women covered in filth. One woman was unclothed
on the lower half of her body and many sores were visible on her skin."' Other like
conditions have been graphically and relentlessly documented throughout all ofEastern
71 Michael L. Perlin, Chimes of Freedom: International Human Rights and Institutional Mental
Disability Law, 21 N.Y L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 423, 428-429 (2002), citing PERLIN, THP,
supra note 3, at 59-76; Grant Morris & J. Reid Meloy, Out of Mind? Out of Sight: The Uncivil
Commitment of Permanently Incompetent Criminal Defendants, 27 U.C. DAVIS L. Rev. 1 (1993);
Perlin, Paradise, supra note 16, at 1046-1047.
See Perlin, supra note 6, at 849-859, 859-863, & 873-886.
s Amnesty International, Romania, Memorandum to the Government Concerning Inpatient Psychiatric
Treatment (2004), available at http: /www.web.amnesty.org/library/print/engeur390032004 (last
visited September 25, 2006).
Amnesty International press release, Bulgaria: Disabled Women Condemned to "Slow Death,'
Al-index: EUR 15/002/2001.
ISR. L. REX. Vol. 39 No. 3. 2006
Europe; 2 Oliver Lewis's extensive investigations of a cluster of Eastern European
nations found, by way of example, persistent and unrelenting violations of Article 5 of
the ECHR, noting that in many nations, public psychiatric hospital staff were not even
aware of the existence of these international human rights provisions.1
3
Conditions in China's institutions continue to violate international law. Writing
soon after Munro's article was published, Dr. Paul Appelbaum, former president of the
American Psychiatric Association, concluded that "At least some of the evidence cited
by Munro suggests deliberate use by psychiatrists of diagnoses of mental disorders to
facilitate the system's efforts to crush challenges to its social and political domination
of the populace."" Since that time, there has been much written about the treatment
of persons adhering to the teachings of Falun Gong:
5
After 1999, Falun Gong members continued to protest as some of the
more deplorable acts perpetrated against the group came to light and
international attention focused on the group's plight. In addition to
continuing reports that thousands of Falun Gong were being held in
forced labor or "re-education" camps, it was revealed that stalwart
Falun Gong members who had protested on numerous occasions
were sent to a psychiatric hospital not due to mental illness, but for
82 Oliver Lewis, Mental Disability Law in Central and Eastern Europe: Paper Practice, Promise, 8
J. MENTAL HEALTH L. 293, 294 (2002).
3 1d; See also Mental Disability Advocacy Center, Mental Health Law of the Kyrgyz. Republic andIts
Implementation, § 4.1.1 (2004) report prepared by Dr. Arman Vardanyan, Deborah A. Dorfman, &
Craig Awmiller), MDAC REPORT available at http://wwwv.eurasiahealth.org/health/resources/81502/
(last visited September 25, 2006). See also Perlin, supra note 6, at manuscript at 7 n.24:
On a site visit to a Nicaraguan public hospital in 2003, 1 observed male patients walking
on wards totally naked (with both male and female staff present). Female patients were
brought outside the hospital for lunch. They were wearing "doctor's office" type gowns,
exposing their breasts and buttocks. Food was passed around in large bowls, and there
were no utensils. Each patient had to reach in and scoop out food (some sort of vegetable
stew) with her hands.
Paul S. Appelbaum, Law & Psychiatry: Abuses of Law and Psychiatry in China, 52 PsvCHlAT.
SERV. 1297 (2001).
'5 Falun Gong is a movement that describes itself as emphasizing five sets of yoga-type exercises
designed to "cultivate" one's mind, body, and spirit and thereby gain access to one's inner energy.
See Darryll K. Jones, The Neglected Role of International Altruistic Investment in the Chinese
Transition Economy, 36 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 71, 132 n.232 (2004).
6 Mark J. Leavy, Discrediting Human Rights Abuse as an "Act of State": A Case Study on The
Repression of the Falun Gonj in China and Commentary on International Human Rights Law in
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"re-education." The practice of imprisoning the more recalcitrant
members of the Falun Gong in psychiatric hospitals has come under
increased international scrutiny and criticism.86
A recent and exhaustive report by Human Rights Watch concludes that psychiatric
incarceration is still used for political purposes in China, and that conditions parallel
those found in the Soviet Union in the 1970s and 1980s.17 Note the authors of the
report:
The challenge for the international psychiatric community now is to
find ways of exerting its influence to ensure that China's secretive...
system and other custodial psychiatric facilities around the country
can no longer be used by the security authorities as a long-term
dumping ground for political and religious nonconformists who, for
one reason or another, they find it awkward or inconvenient to bring
to criminal trial.... Advocacy efforts by local and international
psychiatric bodies would also greatly assist in encouraging
individual Western governments and the European Union to take up
the issue, notably by placing the issue of political psychiatric abuse
in China on the formal agenda of the various bilateral human-rights
dialogue sessions that have become, in recent years, a central and
regular feature of Sino-Westem relations.88
Thus, although the use ofpsychiatry as a tool ofpolitical suppression may no longer
be the problem that it was in the 1980's,89 violations of international human rights laws
US Courts, 35 RUTGERS L.J. 749, 760-761 (2004); See also Christopher Chaney, The Despotic
State Department in Refugee Law: Creating Legal Fictions to Support Falun Gong Asylum Claims,
6 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL'Y J. 4 (2005): "According to the Falun Gong, hundreds of its practitioners
have been confined to psychiatric institutions and forced to take medications or undergo electric
shock treatment against their will." And see Theresa Chu, Justice Against Crime of Genocide,
paper presented at the International Academy of Law and Mental Health, Paris, July 2005.
17 Dangerous Minds: Political Psychiatry in China Today and its Origins in the Mao Era, available
at http://hrw.org/reports/2002/china02 (last visited September 25, 2006).
8' Id. See also a document by Physicians for Human Rights, Dual Loyalty & Human Rights in Health
Professional Practice: Pvposed Guidelines and Institutional Mechanisms reprinted and available
at http://www. phrusa.org/healthrights/dl.html (last visited September 25, 2006).
89 But see supra text accompanying notes 85-87, and infra notes 91 (citing to continued abuses in
Russia), and 115 (discussing the institutionalization of members of the Falun Gong in China).
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continue unabated.9° Again, according to Richard Bonnie: "Notwithstanding the 1992
mental health legislation, coercive psychiatry remains largely unregulated and shaped
by the same tendencies toward hyperdiagnosis and overreliance on institutional care
that characterized the communist era." 91
V. Sanism and Pretextuality
We cannot underestimate the extent of our societal blindness to the ongoing violations
of international human rights law in the context of the institutional commitment
and treatment of persons with mental disabilities. Notwithstanding a robust set of
international law principles, standards and doctrines-most based on American
constitutional law decisions and statutory reforms of the past three decades
92-
people with mental disabilities live in some of the harshest conditions that exist in
any society.93 As previously noted, these conditions are the product of neglect, lack
of legal protection against improper and abusive treatment, and primarily, the social
attitudes of sanism and pretextuality."
In the past, I have written regularly about these attitudes in domestic contexts so
as to "seek to expose their pernicious power, the ways in which [they] infect judicial
decisions, legislative enactments, administrative directives, jury behavior, and public
attitudes, the ways that these factors undercut any efforts at creating a unified body
9 See e.g., Winick, supra note 49, at 538 (discussing current conditions in facilities in Hungary,
and concluding that they are "reminiscent of the state of American mental health facilities
thirty-five or more years ago" (and see also id.: "many diagnosed as mentally disabled are
permanently institutionalized in Hungarian psychiatric facilities, although perhaps 50% of
them could live safely in the community with suitable care."). See generally, PERLIN, supra
note 7 at 844-846.
91 Bonnie, supra note 4, at 142. Recent revelations make clear that this is not simply a relic of the
past. See Peter Finn, In Russia, Psychiaty Is Again a Tool Against Dissent, WASHINGTON POST,
Sept. 30, 2006, available at http:/www.washingtonpost.com/Wp-dyn/content/aticle/2006/09/29/
AR2006092901592_pf.html (last visited September 9, 2006).
92 See generally PERuIN, supra note 7, at ch. 2.
9 See, e.g., MENTAL DISABILITY RIGHTS INTERNATIONAL, HUMAN RIGHTS & MENTAL HEALTH: MEXICO
(2000); MENTAL DISABILIT RIGHTS INTERNAIONAL, CHILDREN IN RUSSIA'S LNSTITUTIONS: HUMAN
RIGHTS AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR REFORM (1999); MENTAL DISABILITY RIGHTS INTERNATIONAL, HUMAN
RIGHTS & MENTAL HEALTH: HUNGARY (1997); MENTAL DISABILITY RIGHTS INTERNATIONAL, HUMAN
RIGHTS & MENTAL HEALTH: URUGUAY (1995); ERIC ROSENTHAL ET AL., NOT ON THE AGENDA: HUMAN
RIGHTS OF PEOPLE WITH MENTAL DISABILIEIS IN Kosovo (2002).
9 See supra text accompanying notes 17-19.
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of mental disability law jurisprudence, and the ways that these factors contaminate
scholarly discourse and lawyering practices alike."95 There is no longer any question
in my mind that these same factors infect international mental disability law practice
in the same ways that they infect domestic practice.96
In a recent manuscript, I concluded that an examination of comparative mental
disability law revealed at least five dominant, universal, core factors9 7 that reflected
"the shame that the worldwide state of mental disability law brings to all of us
who work in this field. Each is tainted by the pervasive corruption of sanism that
permeates all of mental disability law. Each reflects a blinding pretextuality that
contaminates legal practice in this area."" This same sanism is, in great part,
to blame for the societal disinterest that allows the conditions discussed here to
fester.
Michael L. Perlin, "Half- Wracked Prejudice Leaped Forth ": Sanism, Pretextualio and Wf'hy and
How Mental Disability Law Developed As It Did, 10 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES. 3, 26 (1999). 1
address these issues extensively in PERLIN, THP, supra note 3, and in a series of law review articles.
See, e.g., Michael L. Perlin, Morality and Pretextuality; Psychiatry and Law: 01 "Ordinary
Common Sense, " Heuristic Reasoning, and Cognitive Dissonance, 19 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY
& L. 131 (1991); Michael L. Perlin, On "Sanism, "46 SMU L. REV.(1992) 373; Michael L. Perlin,
Pretexts and Mental Disability Law: The Case of Competency, 47 U. MIAMI L. REv. 625 (1993);
Michael L. Perlin, Therapeutic Jurisprudence: Understanding the Sanist and Pretextual Bases oJ
Mental Disability Law, 20 N. ENG. J. CRIM. & CIv. CONFINEMENT 369 (1994); Michael L. Perlin,
The ADA andPersons with Mental Disabilities: Can SanistAttitudes Be Undone? 8 J.L. & HEALTH
15 (1993-1994); Michael L Perlin, The Sanist Lives of Jurors in Death Penalty Cases: The Puzzling
Role of "Mitigating" Mental Disability Evidence, 8 NOTRE DAME J. L. ETHICS & PUB. POL' Y 239
(1994); Perlin, supra note 19; Michael L. Perlin, There " No Success Like Failure and Failure's No
Success at All: Exposing the Pretextuality of Kansas v. Hendricks, 92 Nw. U. L. REV 1247 (1998);
Perlin, supra note 16; Michael L. Perlin, You Have Discussed Lepers and Crooks: Sanism in
Clinical Teaching, 9 CLIICAL L. REv. 683 (2003) [hereinafter Perlin, Lepers and Crooks]; Michael
L. Perlin, And My Best Friend, My Doctor Won 't Even Say What It Is I've Got: The Role and
Significance of Counsel in Right to Refuse Treatment Cases, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 735 (2005)
[hereinafter Perlin, Best Friend].
96I discuss this issue extensively in MICHAEL L. PERLIN, "THE CHIMES OF FREEDOM FLASHING": MENTAL
DISABILITY AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS (book manuscript in progress); see also PERLIN, supra
note 7, at ch. 6.
17 (1) Lack of comprehensive legislation to govern the commitment and treatment of persons
with mental disabilities, and failure to adhere to legislative mandates; (2) Lack of
independent counsel and lack of consistent judicial review mechanisms made available to
persons facing commitment and those institutionalized; (3) A failure to provide humane care
to institutionalized persons; (4) Lack of coherent and integrated community programs as
an alternative to institutional care, and (5) Failure to provide humane services to forensic
patients. See PERLIN, supra note 7, at ch. 8.
9 Perlin, supra note 6, at manuscript at 1.
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The United Nations has recently published a Convention on the Rights of
Persons with Disabilities.99 that would "give disability rights organizations a specific
tool for promoting human rights for persons with disabilities in domestic contexts
and to their own government."'' ° That Convention would not necessarily be a full
palliative for the problems discussed in this paper, but it would certainly be a step
in the right direction.
VI. Unanswered Questions
In their analysis of the Russian experience, Bonnie and Polubinskaya summed up
their findings in this manner:
At bottom, the human rights problem raised by these prosecutions
is the criminalization of dissent; repression of dissent is problematic
whether the dissenter is sent to jail or to a psychiatric hospital.
However, it would be a mistake to regard the hospitalization of
dissidents as only a derivative problem. To hospitalize a dissenter
who is not mentally ill on grounds of non-imputability combines
repression with moral fraud and magnifies the violation of human
rights; it demeans the dissenter's dignity, devalues his or her
message and establishes the legal authority for an indeterminate
period of what can only be called psychiatric punishment.1 1
What is clear now is that the heroic exposes discussed in this Paper-while having
a major impact on the political use of psychiatry in Russia and the Soviet bloc nations
-have not solved many of the underlying problems. As Robin Munro's work teaches
us,1 0 2 political dissidents and outsiders in China still face punishment in the guise of
Shttp://www.un.org/esa/socdevlenable/rights/iahc8adart.htm (last visited, October 14, 2006). For a
thoughtful and comprehensive predecessor article, see Aaron Dhir, Human Rights Treaty Drafting
Through the Lens f Mental Disability: The Proposed International Convention on Protection and
Promotion of the Rights and Dignity of Persons with Disabilities, 41 STAN. J. INT'L L. 181 (2005).
00 Theresia Degener & Gerard Quinn, A Survey ofInternational, Comparative andRegional Disability
Law Reform, in DIsABILITY RIGHTS LAw &PoLICY: INTERNAIIONAL AND NATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 3, 18
(Mary Lou Breslin & Silvia Yee eds., 2002).
01 Bonnie & Polubinskaya, supra note 39, at 280-822.
112 See supra text accompanying notes 55-60.
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psychiatric hospitalization. And, moreover, the amelioration of conditions in Russia,
while certainly more than cosmetic, have done little or nothing to improve the plight of
those persons institutionalized for non-political reasons in many of the former Soviet
bloc nations. 103 I believe that the universality of sanism is, in large part, responsible
for this situation. In short, the publicity and attention that focused on the political
misuses of state psychiatry resulted in discrete amelioration in one area (the treatment
of psychiatric "political prisoners" in Russia). But this amelioration did not extend to:
1) "political prisoners" elsewhere, and, 2) non-political residents of state psychiatric
facilities in these same nations.
Having said this, I believe that this overview leaves many unanswered questions.
I will briefly address them in the hopes that they will now be added to others'
research agendas. First, has the political use of psychiatry is (or has been) limited to
nations with a history of totalitarian governments?
It should not surprise anyone that there is also a history of such political use of
psychiatry in the United States against important political and cultural figures. Ezra
Pound, Alger Hiss, -General Walker and others were removed from public prominence
through hospitalization.0 4 Were cases like this were sui generis, or are they more
typical than might be expected? Notes Professor Alexander on this point: "There are
a number of other cases of politically prominent figures who were disposed of behind
the bars of institutions but, as in the other forms of alleged madness, the bulk of those
disposed of have been relatively powerless."'0 5 The hands of the authorities in the
United States have, historically, been far from clean.
Second, If the excesses described by Profs. Bonnie and Polubinskaya have
substantially ceased, do admissions to psychiatric institutions in the former Soviet
Union now comport with due process?
A recent case in the Soviet Republic of Karelia suggests that this is far from so." 6
There, a local court found that a patient, one who had spent nearly two months in the
o See e.g., Lewis, supra note 82, at 293-294, and see infra text accompanying notes 106-112.
See George Alexander, Big Mother: The State s Use of Mental Health Experts in Dependency
Cases 24 , PAC. L.J. 1465, 1475 (1993); see also JONAS RoBrrSCHER, THE POWERS OF PSYCHIATRY,
104-109 (1980).
0 Alexander, supra note 104, at 1475.
00 Available at http:/www'mdac.info/news-reports/news reports.htm (last visited September 25,
2006).
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hospital after being coerced to sign a "voluntary" consent form, 07 had been denied
her statutory right to appear before the court in person, contrary to local law."'8 A
contemporaneous report of the Mental Disability Advocacy Center concluded that
"people with mental health problems in Russia endure humiliating and degrading
treatment regarding access to and use of toilet facilities in psychiatric institutions,
[and that] facilities ... provided to patients suffer such a lack of privacy that patients
experience extreme anxiety and humiliation having to endure such conditions."'019 Even
more recently, lawyers from the Mental Disability Advocacy Center have appealed
to the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture and the UN Working Group on Arbitrary
Detention to intervene in the case of Pavel Shtukaturov who, they allege, is being
involuntarily detained, denied the ight to meet with his attorney and is apparently
being punished and intimidated by hospital authorities for applying to the European
Court of Human Rights."0 The earlier problems, plainly, have not been resolved."'
As Bonnie concludes, "The challenge of mental health reform in Russia and the other
former Soviet states is a daunting one."
'"12
Third, each year, China becomes more and more important to the world's
economy. What impact has that had-and will it have-on the conditions Prof. Munro
describes?
As discussed above, it appears that the problems raised in Munro's article are still
serious ones." 3 Bonnie, for one, is pessimistic about the likelihood of ameliorative
reform, in large part because of what he perceives as Western disinterest: "In the
On the question of whether "voluntary" admissions are, in fact, voluntary, see I PERLIN, supra note
3, § 2C-7.2, at 482-83, discussing Stanley Herr, Civil Rights, UncivilAsylums and the Retarded, 43
U. CrN. L. Rv. 679, 722 (1974), (distinction between voluntary and involuntary often "illusory,")
and David B. Wexler, Foreword Mental Health Law and the Movement Toward Voluntary
Treatment, 62CAL. L. REV. 671, 676 (1974), (distinctions between voluntary and involuntary
hospitalization often "murky.").
Article 34 of Law on Psychiatric Care, and Article 304 of The Civil Code of the Russian
Federation.
" Available at http://wAw.mdac.info/documents/MDAC%/o20Shadow%/o20Report / 20on / 20Estonia
% 20foro 20HRC%202003 (last visited September 25, 2006).
'0 Email from Oliver Lewis, legal director, MDAC (February 28, 2006) (on file with Author).
See also, e.g., http://www.mdac.info/documents/PR _RuAppealCourt_20051216 eng.pdf (press
release, last visited September 20, 2006) "Russian Appeal Court Declares State's Denial to Provide
Services to Children with Disabilities Unlawful;" http://www.mdac.info/documents/PR SvRussia_
20050804_eng.pdf (press release last visited September 20, 2006) Russia's guardianship system
challenged at the European Court of Human Rights."
12 Bonnie, supra note 4, at 142.
'3 See supra text accompanying notes 85-87.
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case of China, the international community does not appear to be willing to press the
regime on human rights, and therefore the path toward ending political abuse will not
be through political liberalization."'1 4 A recent expose in the New York Times tells us
that the use of state psychiatry as a tool of political repression continues unabated in
China.1 5 This is, in short, not a problem that has disappeared since Bonnie expressed
pessimism on this subject some six years ago.
Fourth, if all nations provided top-flight legal services to persons institutionalized
because of mental disability, would these problems disappear?
The development of mental disability law in the United States tracks-inexorably
and almost absolutely-the availability of appointed counsel to persons facing
commitment to psychiatric institutions, to those being treated in such institutions,
and to those seeking release fiom such institutions."6 Without the availability of such
counsel, it is virtually impossible to imagine the existence of the bodies of involuntary
civil commitment law, right to treatment law, right to refuse treatment law, or any
aspect of forensic mental disability law that are now taken for granted." 7 Similarly,
especially in the area of involuntary civil commitment law, the presence of regular
and on-going judicial review has served as a bulwark of protection against arbitrary
state action."'
Put simply, none of these protections-accessible, free counsel, and regular judicial
review-is present in most of the world's mental disability law systems."' It is rare
"' Bonnie, supra note 4, at 143. Rather, he sees Chinese psychiatry as the key to amelioration:
"Instead, the only available path, in the short term, is through, Chinese psychiatry, using the
collegial pressure of international psychiatric and medical organizations." Id.
Joseph Kahn, Sane Chinese Put in Asylum, Doctors Find, N.Y TIMES, March 17, 2006. ("Dutch
psychiatrists have determined that a prominent Chinese dissident who spent 13 years in a police-run
psychiatric institution in Beijing did not have mental problems that would justify his incarceration,
two human rights groups said Thursday.")
1
6See generally, 1 PRLIN, supra note 3, § 2B-1 to §2B-15, at 191-292; see also, e.g., Michael L.
Perlin, Fatal Assumption: A Critical Evaluation qf the Role of Counsel in Mental Disability Cases,
16 LAW & HuM. BEHAv. 39 (1992); Perlin, Lepers and Crooks, supra note 95; Perlin, Best Friend,
supra note 95. In this context, see especially, id at 738, discussing the "meaningful and complex
performance standards for counsel in such cases," set by the Montana Supreme Court in In re the
Mental Health ofK. G.E, 29 P.3d 485 (Mont. 2001).
"See, e.g., 2 PERLIN, supra note 3, at ch. 3; PERLIN, supra note 7, at ch. 2.
"'See, e.g., 1 PERLN, supra note 3§ 2B-12, at 271-73 and see MDAC REPoRT, supra note 83,4.1.2 §.
ii )Lack of Clear Procedures for Judicial Review of Involuntary Civil Commitment Applications)
("reporting on lack of periodic review of commitment findings in Kyrgyz Republic.")
'9.See PERLIN, supra note 7.
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for even minimal access to counsel to be statutorily (or judicially) mandated, and,
even where counsel is legislatively ordered, it is rarely provided. Moreover, the lack
of meaningful judicial review makes the commitment hearing system little more than
a meretricious pretext. The task, as Professor Bonnie has indicated, is "dautming,""
20
and the absence of these safeguards suggest that promises of authentic reform may, in
practice, still be largely illusory.
Fifth, to what extent do these issues "matter" to the political leaders of the nations
in question, and to what extent is it likely that the attitudes of such leaders are likely
to change?
The revelations of the misuse of state psychiatry in Russia attracted local and
world attention in the years soon after the dissolution of the former Soviet Union."'
The recent issuance of a report by Mental Disability Rights International (MDRI)
excoriating Turkey for its "barbaric" widespread use of electroconvulsive or "shock"
treatment (ECT) on psychiatric patients- as young as 9 years old-without the
accompanying use of anesthesia 122 has come to be an issue in the debate over that
nation's application to become a member ofthe European Union,123 and that application
has apparently given some leverage to those disability rights group that seek to have
such practices banned.'24
120 Bonnie, supra note 4, at 142.
121 See Bonnie & Polubinskaya, supra note 39.
122 BEHIND CLOSED DOORS: HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES IN THE PSYCHIATRIC FACILITIES, ORPHANAGES AND
REHABILITATION CENTERS OF TUREEY (2005), available at www.mdri.org/projects/'turkey (last visited
September 25, 2006).
121 See European Union Calls on Turkey to Improve Rights of People with Mental Disabilities,
reprinted at http://ww .disabili.yorld.org/12-01_06/mdriturkey.shtml (last visited September
25. 2006).
'24See http://www.mdri.orgi'projects/turkeyMDRI EU PressRelease.pdf (last visited September
25, 2006):
It is extremely important that the EU has raised concerns about the human rights of people
with disabilities in Turkey," said Eric Rosenthal, Executive Director of Mental Disability
Rights International. "Abuses that take place behind the closed doors of institutions are
all too often overlooked by the public and international oversight bodies. By raising these
concerns, the EU report ensures that egregious abuses against children and adults with
mental disabilities will be taken into account as Turkey applies for EU accession.
See also, Craig Smith, Abuse f Mentally Ill Is Reported in Turkey, N.Y. Tims, Sept.28, 2005:
The report, by Mental Disability Rights International, an advocacy group based in
Washington, is likely to complicate the EU talks because many European officials are
already wary of letting Turkey join the Union and will use any evidence that the country
falls short of European standards to argue against its membership. But the authors of the
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These examples aside, however, this issue certainly does not appear high on
the agenda of the most pressing social issues in the nations discussed in this paper,
notwithstanding the fact that many of these practices (if not all) appear to be gross
violations of international human rights. 25 The early works by Professor Alexander,"1
6
the exposes by Munro 127 by Bloch and Reddaway,
12
1 the research by Bonnie (alone 129
and with Polubinskaya, 30 and later work (still very much ongoing) by MDRI and
MDAC'3 ' have performed a remarkable public service in highlighting these abuses
and by carefully demonstrating how these nations in question, consistently and
unremittingly, have violated (and continue to violate) international law.
The two topics on which I have focused in this paper-the political use of state
psychiatry and the wretched conditions in which "nonpolitical" individuals are held
and treated in state psychiatric facilities-cannot be understood as two discrete and
unrelated issues. They are connected in very important ways, and it is critical that we
understand that connection.
The Russian state (and other Soviet bloc nations) used (and China continues
to use) state psychiatry as a means of silencing dissidents for multiple reasons: so
as to allow the state to circumvent the (minimal) procedural safeguards that would
have to attend a criminal trial; to allow for indefinite confinement, and to stigmatize
and thus discredit potential political threats. 3 2 The very same states treat patients
in public psychiatric hospitals in ways that utterly fail to meet minimal standards of
human decency, and that violate the MI Principles' by means that avoid procedural
safeguards (as to fair hearing and periodic review), 3 4 and freely perpetuate these
actions because the persons who are institutionalized are stigmatized as a result of
report hope that the pressure will bring a quick end to the worst abuses. "We realized
Turkey was a great opportunity for using that process to have some influence," said Eric
Rosenthal, Mental Disability Rights International's founder...
'25 See PERLIN, supra note 7, at ch. 8.
12 See Alexander, supra note 1; Alexander, supra note 104.
127 See Munro, supra note 55.
21S ee BLOCH & REDDAWAY, supra note 27; BLOCH & RDDAWAY, supra note 28; Bloch & Reddaway,
supra note 29.
'29 See Bonnie, supra note 4; Bonnie, supra note 39.
38 See Bonnie & Polubinskaya, supra note 39.
'3' See supra notes 93 & 122 (MDRI), and notes 83, 106, & 118 (MDAC).
132 See Bloch & Reddaway, supra note 29, at 152.
See generally supra note 74, and see e.g., cases cited in Gostin & Gable, supra note 37; Rosenthal
& Rubenstein, supra note 12, and Rosenthal & Sundra, supra note 49, passim.
'31 See supra note 118.
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their mental illness-the inevitable end-product of sanism-and are thus discredited
as human beings.'35
Although these motivations may not be "political" (in the sense that those being
mistreated are not necessarily identified as political dissidents or dissenters), 3 ' the
outcome of state action is political in that it reflects the state's failure to take seriously
the human rights of persons whom it has institutionalized because of mental illness.
The recent expose of the unregulated use of ECT in Turkey, (and the impact of
that expose on Turkey's aspirations to European Union membership) show us that
mistreatment of the non-political remains, at its core, a political act.
Writing in 1993, Eric Rosenthal and Leonard Rubenstein first illuminated how the
MI Principles "come from an individualistic, libertarian perspective that emphasizes
restrictions on what the state can do to a person with mental illness." '13 A presenter at
a conference held at New York Law School on the treatment of persons with mental
disabilities referred to this article, and then told the audience, "Without advocates
willing to get in the trenches and fight for these ideals, so that they might become a
reality for persons with mental disabilities, these treaties and standards remain mere
words without action."'1t This is a goal to which all of us who take this area of law
and society seriously should aspire.
131 See Falter v. Veterans' Admin., 502 F. Supp. 1178, 1185 (D.N.J. 1980) (central inquiry is "how
[persons with mental disabilities] are treated as human beings"), discussed in this context in Perlin,
supra note 20, at 541 n.49.
36 Except, of course, in China.
13 Rosenthal & Rubenstein, supra note 12, at 260.
3 Svmposium: International Human Rights Law and the Institutional Treatment of Persons with
Mental Disabilities: The Case of Hungary, 21 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 361, 381 (2002)
(remarks of Jean Bliss).
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